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Abstract 
 
This study investigates how the supply of foreign 
labor in virtual versus physical markets responds to 
monetary incentives using information on digital labor 
flows from a major global online labor platform for IT 
services in conjunction with data on physical labor 
flows into the United States. We use exogenous 
changes in the exchange rate as a source of 
identification: a depreciation of a country’s currency 
against the US dollar exogenously increases the 
incentives of its workers to seek employment in the 
United States. Our results suggest that monetary 
incentives, measured as a depreciation of a country’s 
currency against the US dollar, have a substantial 
impact on the supply of foreign labor in virtual 
markets. However, we do not find that monetary 
incentives have a statistically significant impact on the 
supply of foreign labor in physical markets, which 
might be expected since physical migration faces 
substantial bureaucratic restrictions and transaction 
costs.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Legal barriers to migration block massive 
efficiency enhancing migration flows from poor to 
rich countries, and arguably represent one of the 
greatest inefficiencies in the global economy. The 
economic losses due to migration restrictions have 
been estimated to range between 20 and 60 percent of 
the global GDP, a magnitude that is one or two orders 
of magnitude larger than the combined economic 
losses due to the barriers to trade and capital flows [1]. 
The sheer size of these inefficiencies reveals that even 
small migration flows are capable of having 
significant efficiency gains. 
Online markets often escape the rules of traditional 
markets and have their own alternate reality. For 
instance, consumers can avoid paying sales taxes 
when they make online purchases from websites that 
do not have a physical store in their states, and 
international workers and firms can sometimes 
circumvent the legal barriers to physical migration and 
engage in remote working relationships with foreign 
partners. Our primary objective in this paper is to 
investigate how elastic the supply of foreign labor in 
the digital world is to changes in income. Since 
foreigners can work for American employers either by 
engaging in virtual working relationships with 
American employers or by physically immigrating 
into the United States, we also study how the income 
elasticity of the labor supply in virtual markets 
compares with the income elasticity of physical labor 
flows into the United States. 
Addressing these questions requires the use of data 
on both the supply of labor in virtual markets and 
physical labor flows, and the existence of an 
exogenous shock affecting the pecuniary incentives of 
foreigners to seek employment from American 
employers. In this paper, we use just such a data set on 
virtual and physical labor flows into the United States, 
and we employ the change in the exchange rate as an 
exogenous shock affecting workers’ virtual labor 
supply functions and physical migration incentives. 
Specifically, a depreciation of a country’s exchange 
rate against the US dollar increases foreign workers’ 
incentives to engage in virtual working relationships 
with employers in the United States, since a 
depreciation of a foreign country’s exchange rate 
implies that a given monetary compensation 
denominated in US dollars represents a higher 
monetary compensation measured in the foreign 
worker’s domestic currency. Similarly, a depreciation 
of the of a country’s exchange rate against the US 
dollar increases foreign workers’ incentives to 
physically migrate and seek employment in the United 
States, since transfers of money to migrants’ own 
countries (i.e., remittances) and wealth accumulation 
for the return (i.e., return savings) are known to drive 
physical migration [2-4]. 
Although migration indisputably increases global 
economic efficiency, migration flows can also create 
winners and losers. It is therefore not surprising that 
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there has been a substantial amount of research and 
political controversy regarding how traditional 
physical migration and offshoring activities to other 
countries affect local labor markets. On the one hand, 
both hiring immigrants and offshoring can reduce the 
demand for domestic workers via a direct substitution 
effect [5-7].  On the other hand, hiring immigrants and 
offshoring may reduce production costs and increase 
production efficiency, leading to an increase in the 
demand for domestic workers [8, 9]. While the 
academic research as well as the political controversy 
on this topic has focused on traditional physical 
migration flows, the fast growth in virtual migration 
that is currently taking place will shortly bring online 
labor markets under scrutiny. 
Early research focusing on online labor markets 
predicted that the Internet facilitates the exchange of 
labor by reducing search and transaction costs [10] and 
increasing both labor demand and supply, which may 
result in increased match quality and efficiency [11]. 
It has been, however, more recent that the proliferation 
of online labor platforms (e.g., Upwork, Freelancer, 
Zhubajie/Witmart) has given birth to an actively 
growing literature empirically studying online labor 
markets. Our paper contributes most directly to this 
empirical literature on online labor markets. 
Some studies in this empirical literature focus on 
analyzing how various types of information, quality 
signals, and worker characteristics affect employers’ 
hiring decisions (e.g., Gefen and Carmel [12], Lin et 
al. [13], Moreno and Terwiesch [14], and Pallais [15] 
focused on the role of reputation systems; Agrawal et 
al. [16] and  Pallais [15] on the role of worker 
experience; Stanton and Thomas [17] on agency 
affiliation; Chan and Wang [18] on the role of gender; 
and Ghani et al. [19] on the role of ethnicity).  
Another stream of papers in this literature analyzes 
worker behavior in online labor platforms (e.g., Chen 
and Horton [20] found that workers respond to wage 
cuts by quitting; Snir and Hitt [21] found excessive 
bidding; and Moreno and Terwiesch [14] found that 
workers increase their reservation wages when their 
reputation scores improve).  
Finally, some studies analyze the role of 
geographic and cultural differences in online labor 
markets (e.g., Gefen and Carmel [12] analyzed 
employer behavior in online labor markets finding that 
employers prefer domestic workers; Agrawal et al. 
[16] found that freelancers from developing countries 
have a lower winning probability compared with 
similar freelancers from developed countries; Hong 
and Pavlou [22] examined how differences in 
language, culture, and time zone affect employers' 
hiring choices; and Gong [23] examined the role of 
geographic and economic differences in the matching 
between workers and employers). Our paper 
contributes to this empirical literature by studying 
global digital labor flows and comparing the 
differences in how pecuniary motivation affects 
virtual versus physical labor flows. 
 
2. Background and hypotheses 
 
Although world-wide surveys report that vast 
numbers of people express desire to physically migrate 
from poor to rich countries, only approximately 220 
million people (accounting for 3.3 percent of the 
world’s population) lived outside their countries of 
origin in 2015 [24]. 
Prior research shows that policy barriers to global 
physical labor mobility play a critical role in 
restricting the migration of labor across borders, and 
that the restrictions to physical migration from low-
wage to high-wage countries are a contender for the 
title of creating the single greatest economic 
inefficiency in the global economy [1]. Because 
virtual labor flows are not accounted for when 
estimating the size of these inefficiencies, and virtual 
labor flows have the potential to alleviate the massive 
costs due to the restrictions to physical migration [25], 
measuring the size of the income elasticity of the 
supply of foreign labor in virtual versus physical 
markets is important. Moreover, our study is also 
timely, owing to the current political controversy in 
the United States concerning immigration. 
Our study focuses on studying immigration into 
the United States, which adopts an employer-driven 
program to regulate the employment of foreign 
workers [3, 25]. For example, the H-1B nonimmigrant 
visa program allows U.S. employers to temporally 
recruit foreign workers in “specialty occupations,” 
defined as positions that typically require specialized 
knowledge and attainment of a bachelor’s or higher 
degree. In addition, in an attempt to protect domestic 
workers, employers are required to pay the foreign 
worker the higher of the actual or prevailing wage for 
the position. Since 2004, the statutory cap is 65,000 
new visas per year, in addition to 20,000 visas under 
the advanced degree exemption. However, compared 
to the annual cap, the number of H-1B petitions filed 
each year is much higher. For the 2018 fiscal year, 
USCIS received 199,000 H-1B petitions, and the 
annual cap was filled within the first week of the filing 
period. 
Due to these policy barriers to physical labor 
mobility, we expect that the supply of labor in the 
physical world to be relatively inelastic to inter-
temporal variations in monetary incentives. 
Specifically, due to the policy restrictions that the 
United States imposes on its employment-based 
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immigration programs (e.g., the H-1B visa program) 
and the lengthy process it takes for a foreign worker to 
obtain a work visa permit, we expect that the supply of 
foreign labor into the United States would be relatively 
inelastic to inter-temporal variations in monetary 
incentives.  
Conversely, our expectation is that online labor 
platforms can circumvent the policy barriers to 
physical migration [25] and reduce search and 
transaction costs [10]. On online labor platforms such 
as Upwork and Freelancer, foreign workers can 
engage in virtual working relationships with American 
employers without the need to acquire temporary work 
visa permits from the U.S. government. Therefore, we 
expect that, virtual labor flows are more elastic to 
inter-temporal variations in monetary incentives, and 
more specifically, to fluctuations in bilateral exchange 
rates. 
Comparing the size of the elasticities of the supply 
of foreign labor in physical versus virtual markets 
provides information about the stringency of the 
restrictions to physical and virtual labor flows. These 
estimates also serve as ingredients to measure the 
inefficiency costs due to the restrictions to physical 
migration and to gauge the extent to which virtual 
labor flows can alleviate these inefficiencies.  
 
3. Data and context 
  
In our empirical analysis, we use a proprietary 
database from a major global online labor platform for 
IT services containing information on labor flows in 
the digital world. 1  The focal online labor platform 
serves as an intermediary that connects employers and 
potential workers for IT service projects, which are 
typically small or medium sized projects. The platform 
uses a reverse auction mechanism, where employers 
solicit bids by posting project descriptions and 
workers submit bids by specifying a dollar amount to 
complete the project.2 When the bidding period ends, 
employers evaluate all the bids and choose a winning 
worker to complete the project. Employers choose the 
winning worker based on the dollar amount and other 
factors such as experience, certification, or prior 
ratings.  
The raw dataset includes data on all projects posted 
between February 2004 and September 2010. 
Specifically, we observe detailed information on all 
                                                          
1 www.Freelancer.com 
2 Sellers submit bids in reverse auctions, unlike ordinary auctions 
where buyers submit bids. Note that in our context workers are the 
sellers and employers are the buyers. 
3 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/ert/GUI/Pages/CountryDataBa
se.aspx 
projects: employers who posted those projects, bids, 
workers, and winning workers. In this study, we focus 
on employers located in the United States, since it is 
where the majority of the employers are located. Using 
the raw data, we construct a panel dataset that includes 
information on counts of monthly country-level 
“digital” labor flows into to the Unites States, which 
we measured by counting the country-level number of 
workers’ bids to job postings by employers in the 
United States. Our database includes information on 
monthly virtual country-level labor flows into the 
United States from 91 countries (7,280 country-month 
level observations). 
Our examination of how the virtual labor supply 
responds to changes in monetary incentives leverages 
exogenous changes in the exchange rate as a source of 
identification. The rationale behind using the 
exchange rate as a source of identification is that 
changes in the exchange rate are likely to affect 
workers’ labor supply decisions. For example, when 
the US dollar appreciates relative to Indian Rupee, 
Indian workers may have higher incentives to work for 
U.S. employers since they would now receive a higher 
monetary compensation. Moreover, changes in the 
exchange rate are unlikely to be affected by the virtual 
labor supply (i.e., exogenous). For our study, we 
obtained information on the nominal exchange rates 
from the International Monetary Fund.3 Because we 
are interested in measuring the effect of a currency 
devaluation while holding workers’ countries price 
levels fixed, we need information on the evolution of 
the price index, which we also obtained from the 
International Monetary Fund.4  
In addition to examining how virtual labor flows 
respond to changes in monetary compensation, we are 
interested in studying how changes in monetary 
compensation affect physical migration flows. There 
are a few important data challenges in studying this 
question. For example, a fraction of the immigration 
into the United States is illegal and data on illegal 
immigration into the United States by country of 
origin are not available. In our empirical analysis, we 
use data on the number of temporary nonimmigrant 
workers5 into the United States by country of origin 
from the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics published 
by the Department of Homeland Security.6 We believe 
using data on temporary nonimmigrant workers is 
preferred to using data on permanent immigrants 
4 http://data.imf.org/?sk=5DABAFF2-C5AD-4D27-A175-
1253419C02D1 
5  The Department of Homeland Security defines the following 
classifications as temporary nonimmigrant workers: E1 to E3, H1B, 
H1B, H1C, H2A, H2B, H2R, H3, H4, I1, L1, L2, O1 to O3, P1 to 
P4, Q1, R1, R2, TD, and TN. 
6 https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook 
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because temporary workers are more likely to respond 
quickly to a change in monetary compensation (e.g., 
obtaining a permanent resident status takes a long time 
and is unlikely to respond quickly to a change in the 
exchange rate). Further, our data on physical migration 
are not as granular as our digital migration data and are 
only available at the country-year level instead of the 
country-month level.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our data on 
digital labor flows. Our data on digital labor flows 
contain a total of 7,280 observations, but our 
regressions below use a subsample sample of 4,910 
observations which have complete information on the 
exchange rate and price level.7  The mean number of 
bids amounts to 532.1 in the entire sample and 729.9 
in the regression subsample. The standard deviations 
in Table 1 reveal wide variation in the number of bids 
across observations. This wide variation in the data is 
driven by variation both within and between countries. 
Table 1 also shows wide variations in the exchange 
rate and CPI, but the variation in these variables is 
mostly driven by variation in the data between 
countries. However, some countries in the sample 
experienced large fluctuations in the exchange rate. 
For example, the South African currency (the ZAR) 
experienced a sudden appreciation in 2008, from 8.06 
ZAR per USD in October 2008 to 9.74 ZAR per USD 
in November 2008 (a 21% increase within a month). 
Figure 1 presents two examples of countries 
experiencing large fluctuations in the exchange rate.
 
Table 1. Digital migration: summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Full Sample 
Number of Bids 7,280 532.101 3230.209 0 54536 
log (Worker Country Currency per USD) 6,852 1.289 2.123 -2.077 9.380 
log (Worker Country CPI) 5,292 4.475 0.140 3.696 4.674 
Estimation Sample 
Number of Bids 4,910 729.934 3901.180 0 54536 
log (Worker Country Currency per USD) 4,910 1.605 2.270 -2.077 9.380 
log (Worker Country CPI) 4,910 4.477 0.143 3.696 4.674 
 
Table 2. Physical migration: summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Full Sample 
Number of Temporary Workers 361 21508.900 53363.250 3 360903 
log (Worker Country Currency per USD) 355 1.662 2.328 -1.314 9.249 
log (Worker Country CPI) 341 4.478 0.123 3.883 4.680 
Estimation Sample 
Number of Temporary Workers 330 22679.240 55523.390 3 360903 
log (Worker Country Currency per USD) 330 1.656 2.333 -1.314 9.249 
log (Worker Country CPI) 330 4.479 0.124 3.883 4.680 
 
Table 2 presents information on physical labor 
flows. The mean number of temporary workers 
entering the United States amounts to 21,508.9 in the 
entire sample and 22,679.2 in the regression 
                                                          
7 This estimation sample contains information from 70 countries, 
including United Arab Emirates, Austria, Belgium, Bahrain, Brazil, 
Brunei, Bhutan, Botswana, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, Colombia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Algeria, Ecuador, 
Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, UK, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, 
Indonesia, India, Ireland, Iran, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, 
Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Mexico, Malta, 
Mauritius, Malaysia, Namibia, Netherlands, Norway, Nepal, Oman, 
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, El Salvador, San Marino, 
Slovenia, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Uruguay, 
United States, Venezuela, and South Africa. 
subsample.8  Similar to the data in digital labor flows, 
the data on physical labor flows in Table 2 show wide 
variation across observations. 
 
8 This estimation sample contains information from 69 countries, 
including United Arab Emirates, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Bahrain, Brazil, Brunei, Bhutan, Botswana, Canada, Switzerland, 
Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, 
Algeria, Ecuador, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, UK, Greece, 
Haiti, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Iran, Iceland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Kuwait, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, 
Mexico, Malta, Mauritius, Malaysia, Namibia, Netherlands, 
Norway, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, El 
Salvador, Slovenia, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, and South Africa. 
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Figure 1. Examples of countries experiencing 
large currency fluctuations 
 
4. Model 
 
Our objective in this paper is to study the 
sensitivity of the supply of labor in virtual and physical 
markets to monetary compensation changes. One 
empirical identification strategy to investigate the 
elasticity of the supply of labor in virtual markets is to 
examine the behavior of workers who reside abroad 
and seek to engage in working relationships with 
employers in the United States. Specifically, we can 
use the following fixed effects model: 
Number of Bids
i,USA,t
 
=β
0
 
+β
1
Monetary Incentive to Offer Labor Services
i,USA,t
 
+αPrice Indexit 
+σi,USA+ωt+εi,USA,t            (1) 
where i represents a country, and t represents a month. 
The dependent variable Number of Bids
i, USA,t
 
represents the number of bids from workers in country 
i to job postings from employers in the United States 
in month t. The independent variable 
Monetary Incentive to Offer Labor Services
i,USA,t
 
represents the monetary incentive to virtually offer 
their labor services for workers living in country i to 
jobs postings from employers in the United States in 
month t. The independent variable Price Indexit 
represents the price level in the worker’s country i in 
month t. The variable σi,USA  represents a worker 
country fixed effect, ωt  represents a month fixed 
effect, and εi,USA,t represents the error. 
While Model (1) cannot be estimated because the 
monetary incentive to offer labor services for workers 
in country i to the United States is unobservable, we 
can assume the following relationship: 
Monetary Incentive to Offer Labor Services
i,USA,t
 
=a1Nominal Exchange Ratei,USA,t           (2) 
which assumes that the monetary incentive to offer 
labor services to employers in the United States for a 
worker living in country i increases with an increase in 
the nominal exchange rate between country i and the 
United States (i.e., an increase in the number of units 
of the worker’s domestic currency per US dollar). 
Therefore, our model hypothesizes that the incentives 
of a worker in any given country to work for an 
employer located in the United States would increase 
when the US dollars paid by the employer can buy 
more units of the foreign worker’s domestic currency.  
Substituting (2) into (1) we get an expression that 
we can estimate with our available data: 
Number of Bids
i,USA,t
 
=β
0
 
+π1Nominal Exchange Ratei,USA,t 
+αPrice Indexit 
+σi,USA+ωt+εi,USA,t                           (3) 
Note that our model controls for the evolution of 
the price index in the worker’s country. This is 
important because it implies that the coefficient π1 in 
Model (3) measures the effect of a devaluation of the 
worker’s domestic currency (an increase in the number 
of units of the worker’s domestic currency per US 
dollar), holding fixed the price level in the worker’s 
country. Thus, the coefficient π1  in Model (3) 
measures the effect of a real increase in the worker’s 
purchasing power. 
In our empirical analysis below, we present 
regression results excluding and including fixed 
effects by worker country and year-month. Model (3) 
does not include additional covariates. This is in part 
because there is a practical data availability limitation 
of finding data at the monthly level for a large number 
of countries. More importantly, when our model 
includes worker country fixed effects 𝜎𝑖,𝑈𝑆𝐴 , these 
fixed effects account for time-invariant country level 
unobservable characteristics such country sizes, 
language, or cultural traits. The inclusion of worker 
country fixed effects in our model also controls for 
worker-employer country-pair (country i and the 
USA) time invariant factors such as the geographical 
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proximity, the proximity in cultural traits (e.g., 
language, religion), and the time difference between 
the worker’s country and the United States. The year-
month fixed effects ωt in our model account for non-
parametric time trends in the number of bids. 
In this paper, we are also interested in comparing 
the sensitivity of the supply of labor to monetary 
compensation changes in virtual versus physical 
markets. We study physical migration by using the 
following model: 
 Number of Temp Workers
i,USA,y
 
=β
0
 
+π1Nominal Exchange Ratei,USA,y 
+αPrice Indexiy 
+σi,USA+ωy+εi,USA,y            (4) 
which is similar to Model (3) but has two notable 
differences. First, in Model (4), the dependent variable 
measures the number of temporary workers from 
country i into the United States per year. Second, the 
data availability limitations restrict our analysis to the 
yearly level for physical migration. 
The dependent variables in our model are count 
variables that have a substantial proportion of zeros. In 
our setting, the advantages of using Poisson regression 
over using OLS regression with a log-transformed 
dependent variable are well known [26]. As pointed 
out by O’Hara and Kotze [27], an OLS estimator with 
log-transformed dependent variable would result in 
severely biased estimates, especially when in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity [28]. Because our 
model contains fixed effects, we use a Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator [28, 29] that 
has been widely used in studies with count panel data 
[30-32], and offers several benefits over other 
estimators such as a fixed effect negative binomial 
[33]. An additional advantage of the PPML estimator 
is that it does not impose an equi-dispersion condition 
(a condition that is imposed by the standard Poisson 
estimator [34]), making the estimator suitable even in 
the presence of over-dispersion. The use of PPML also 
facilitates a valid inference because it allows the 
estimation of clustered standard errors allowing for 
heteroskedasticity across countries and serial 
correlation within workers’ countries. 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
5.1. Digital labor flows 
 
Table 3 presents estimation results of our empirical 
model measuring digital labor flows, excluding 
(Column 1) and including (Column 2) fixed effects by 
worker-country and year-month. The number of 
workers’ bids is measured as a count variable and the 
exchange rate is measured in logarithms. Because our 
regressions control for the evolution of the price index 
within workers’ countries, the coefficient estimate on 
the exchange rate variable measures how currency 
devaluations in workers’ countries affect digital labor 
flows while holding fixed the price levels within 
workers’ countries. The standard errors are clustered 
at the worker country level to allow for 
heteroskedasticity across countries and for serial 
correlation within workers’ countries. 
 
Table 3. How monetary incentives affect digital migration 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Number of Bids Number of Bids 
log (Worker Country Currency per USD) 0.190** 0.894* 
 (0.0812) (0.538) 
log (Worker Country CPI) 0.418 0.898** 
 (0.951) (0.369) 
Observations 4,910 4,909 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.0502 0.995 
Worker Country FE No Yes 
Year-Month FE No Yes 
Robust standard errors clustered at the worker-country level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results in both Columns 1 and 2 suggest that a 
devaluation of a country’s currency increases the 
number of bids from its domestic workers to job 
postings from employers in the United States (i.e., 
digital labor flows into the United States), as expected. 
The estimation results in Columns 1 and 2, however, 
have substantially different implications in terms of 
the size of the estimated digital migration effect. 
Because we estimate a Poisson regression model and 
we measure the exchange rate variable in logarithms, 
the estimated coefficient on the exchange rate variable 
(approximately) represents an elasticity. While the 
results in Column 1 of Table 3 suggest that a 
devaluation of 100% of a country’s currency increases 
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digital labor flows by approximately 19%, the more 
reliable results in Column 2 of Table 3, including fixed 
effects by worker-country and year-month, suggest 
that a 100% devaluation of a country’s currency 
increases digital labor flows by approximately 89%. 
As we explained before, in our regressions, we 
control for the evolution of the price index within 
workers’ countries because we are interested in 
measuring the effect of a currency devaluation while 
holding workers’ countries price levels fixed. The 
estimated coefficient on the price index variable itself 
is positive, which may be due to income effects since 
high inflation is known to be positively correlated with 
poor conditions in the labor market [35].  Workers 
from countries facing poor labor market conditions 
may be forced to seek employment opportunities 
abroad. 
We explained before that our model does not 
include additional covariates because fixed effects 
regression models do not allow for the inclusion of 
time-invariant country-level control variables (e.g., 
country sizes, language, or cultural traits).9 We also 
explained, however, that the inclusion of fixed effects 
by worker-country controls for all these country-level 
time invariant factors and worker-employer country-
pair time invariant factors such as the geographic or 
cultural proximity between the worker and employer 
countries. We also explained before how the inclusion 
of fixed effects by year-month accounts for time trends 
(note that the pseudo R-squared amounts to 0.995). 
Thus, we believe our model serves our goal of 
identifying how sensitive the supply of labor in virtual 
markets is to changes in the monetary compensation. 
 
5.2. Physical labor flows 
 
Table 4 presents estimation results of our empirical 
model measuring physical labor flows, excluding 
(Column 1) and including (Column 2) fixed effects by 
worker-country and year. Note that our data on 
physical labor flows are more limited than our data on 
digital labor flows because physical labor flows are 
measured at the year and not at the month level. 
Similar to Table 3, Table 4 measures the number of 
temporary workers moving to the United States as a 
count variable and the exchange rate in logarithms, 
and thus the coefficient on the exchange rate variable 
(approximately) represents an elasticity. Also, similar 
to Table 3, the standard errors in Table 4 are clustered 
at the worker country level. 
 
Table 4. How monetary incentives affect physical migration 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Number of 
Temporary Workers  
Number of 
Temporary Workers  
log (Worker Country Currency per USD) 0.0728 0.770 
 (0.0864) (0.613) 
log (Worker Country CPI) 1.487 1.055* 
 (2.293) (0.554) 
Observations 330 293 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.0133 0.982 
Worker Country FE No Yes 
Year FE No Yes 
Robust standard errors clustered at the worker-country level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results in both Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 
suggest a devaluation of a country’s currency does not 
have a statistically significant impact on physical labor 
flows into the United States as measured by the 
number of temporary nonimmigrant workers. In terms 
of size, the estimated effects in Table 4 are also smaller 
compared to the estimated effects in Table 3. This 
might be expected since, as explained before, physical 
labor mobility faces more substantial practical 
restrictions compared to digital labor flows. Similar to 
                                                          
9 Fixed effects regressions also limit the inclusion of variables with 
little variation during our study period (e.g., population). In addition, 
Table 3, it is not surprising that including fixed effects 
increases the pseudo R-squared in Table 4 from 0.0133 
to 0.982, since fixed effects control for a large number 
of unobserved factors. 
The regressions in Table 4 control for the evolution 
of the price index within workers’ countries to 
facilitate the comparison between the results in Tables 
3 and 4. Similar to the results in Table 3, the estimated 
coefficient on the price index variable in Table 4 is 
positive, which supports the conclusion that workers 
there is a practical limitation arising from the limited data 
availability at the monthly level. 
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from countries facing poor labor market conditions are 
more likely to seek employment abroad. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we investigate how digital and 
physical labor flows respond to monetary incentives 
using information on online labor exchanges between 
workers and employers from a major global online 
labor platform for IT services, in conjunction with 
information on physical labor flows into the United 
States from the Department of Homeland Security. 
Our empirical analysis uses exogenous changes in the 
exchange rate as a source of identification. We argue 
that a depreciation of a country’s currency against the 
US dollar increases the incentives of its workers to 
seek employment from employers based in the United 
States. 
Our empirical results suggest that monetary 
incentives, measured as a depreciation of the exchange 
rate of a country’s currency against the US dollar, have 
a substantial impact on the supply of labor in virtual 
markets: in our most comprehensive regressions that 
include fixed effects by country and month, we have 
found that the estimated elasticity of the labor supply 
in virtual markets amounts to 0.89. Conversely, we do 
not find that monetary incentives have a statistically 
significant impact on the physical labor flows into the 
United States, which might be expected since physical 
migration faces substantial bureaucratic restrictions 
and transaction costs. 
Prior empirical estimates show that restrictions to 
physical labor migration generate massive inefficiency 
costs, and our results in this study suggest that online 
labor markets have the potential to reduce these 
deadweight losses. Specifically, online labor markets 
have the potential to reduce the inefficiency costs 
imposed by the legal restrictions to physical migration 
because in online labor markets workers and 
employers can circumvent the bureaucratic deterrents 
to mutually beneficial working relationships. Despite 
the importance of investigating and quantifying the 
elasticity of the labor supply in online markets and of 
examining how digital labor markets can help reduce 
the costs imposed by bureaucratic restrictions to 
physical migration, there is surprisingly little research 
on this topic. There is obviously a need for more 
research to be in a position to accurately predict the 
degree to which Internet labor markets can ameliorate 
the inefficiency costs generated by the bureaucratic 
restrictions to physical labor migration, and we believe 
our paper is a first step in that direction. 
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